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In July 2018, heavy rain and a large amount of damage to geo-structures and natural slopes were reported in Okayama, Japan. In
particular, in the area surrounding the Oda River System, 52 people drowned due to the breach of river banks. Besides the flooding
of rivers, the earth-fill dams of many water reservoirs were damaged. The stability of the large number of earth-fill dams in the Setouchi
area is very important. Heavy rain is often associated with the collapse of slopes. In Okayama, many shallow slope failures or debris
flows occurred over a wide area, particularly in the western part of the prefecture. Through detailed investigations, the mechanism of
this geo-disaster was clarified.
 2020 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of The Japanese Geotechnical Society. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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In July 2018, heavy rain and a large amount of damage
to soil structures and natural slopes were reported. In par-
ticular, in the area surrounding of the Oda River System,
52 people drowned after river banks were breached. This
disaster was characterized by a long period of precipita-
tion, exceeding 48 h, resulting in the back flow phenomena
and subsequent breach of a number of banks in the Taka-
hashi River System. In the present report, the damage to
river banks, water reservoirs, and slopes, as a result of this
heavy rain, is described.
Along the Oda River and its tributaries (Kurashiki), the
Asahi River (Kunigawara, Kita-ku, Okayama), and the
Sunagawa River (Numa, Higashi-ku, Okayama), manyhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.sandf.2020.01.009
0038-0806/ 2020 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of The
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E-mail address: theg1786@okayama-u.ac.jp (S. Nishimura).breaches of banks were found. It is assumed that the main
reason for the breaches was overflow and the subsequent
erosion of the embankment soil. In addition to the
breaches, both slip shear failures of banks and piping fail-
ures were discovered at several locations.
The earth-fill dams at water reservoirs experienced over-
flow failures, piping failures, and slope failures. Of the
approximately 9000 earth-fill dams in Okayama, more than
70% were constructed before the Meiji Period, and their
banks have deteriorated. It is reasonable to assume that
the stability problems of old earth-fill dams will become
more serious with time in the Setouchi Area. Detailed con-
sideration is given here to the reasons for the failures which
resulted i damage to river banks and earth-fill dams.
The geology in Okayama Prefecture can be categorized
mainly as decomposed granite (Masa), which is eroded
easily by the surface flow. Shallow slope failures and debris
flows have been found over a widespread area. The local
governments have categorised the risk to slopes, and theJapanese Geotechnical Society.
ommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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asters is discussed here.2. Weather and rainfall in Okayama from July 5 to 7, 2018
Fig. 2.1 depicts the movement of rain clouds from July 6
to 7. The rainfall intensity was considerable in the northern
and western areas of Okayama during the 48-hour period.
Fig. 2.2 presents the total rainfall from July 5 to 7 in west-
ern Japan. According to the figure, the amount of rainfall
was great over a wide area of western Japan. That is, the
total rainfall in Okayama was not particularly great com-
pared to other places in western Japan. Fig. 2.3 presents
the hyetographs for three locations along the Oda River
in Okayama. It is seen that river banks were breached when
the total rainfall approached the maximum value. The
interesting feature of the precipitation consisting of heavy
rain is that, although the rainfall intensity per hour was
not so great, the cumulative precipitation over 48 h was
tremendous. Fig. 2.4 presents the water level of Oda River.
The water level shows two peaks, one on July 6 and the
other on July 7. Several rivers were breached around the
time of the peak on July 7.3. Damage to river banks
Damage to river banks in Mabi-cho, Kurashiki City,
and Okayama City, and the process of the breaching are
summarized here. The details are reported in ‘‘Investiga-
tion report for the Oda River Banks of Takahashi River
System” by the Chugoku Development Bureau (2018).
Fig. 3.1 presents a map of the locations of the breaching
surrounding the Oda River.3.1. Breach of left-side bank of Oda River (point 3k400)
The location of the breach is the confluence of the Oda
and Takahashi Rivers, characterized as an alluvial fan.
Traces of the old river and the flood plane were found at
this location. The soil layers are very complicated, as
shown in Fig. 3.2. According to the boring data, the profile
is as follows.
(1) The bank materials are composed of sandy soil in the
upper layer and clayey soil in the lower layer.
(2) Under the bank, there is an Ac layer. Underneath the
Ac layer, an As layer is found.
At the end of the breaching section, toward the down-
stream, the breached cross section exhibits an old clayey
bank and a newer bank composed of gravel, including fine
soil covered with a sandy surface layer with less gravel over
the old bank.
Photo 3.1 shows the breached bank, which is 100 m in
length. It is assumed that breaching occurred in the follow-
ing way:(1) Increase in the water table: The high water level (de-
sign high water level) and the infiltration continued
for a relatively long time. The rain and river water
infiltrated the bank.
(2) Occurrence of overflow and inundation inside the
bank: Overflow occurred from the bank of the
Takama River, since the bank of this river is lower
than that of the Oda River. Afterwards, at the conflu-
ence of the Takama and Oda Rivers, particularly at
the corners, the water level increased and overflow
occurred. It was confirmed that the height of the
bank at the location of the breach was lower than
that of the surrounding banks. Following the over-
flow, submergence by inundation inside the bank
occurred in the nearby residential area.
(3) Erosion of the backside slope and digging at the toe
of the bank: The overflow water eroded the backside
of the bank, and then the cross section of the bank
was reduced. At the toe of the bank, a dig 1.2 m in
depth was found.
(4) Breach of the bank: The erosion and the digging con-
tinued, the cross section was further reduced, and
finally, breaching occurred at the confluence. After-
wards, the area of the breach increased along the
bank axis of the Oda River.3.2. Breach of left-side bank of Oda River (point 6k400)
Breaching occurred at the Ichinokuchi Gate of the con-
fluence of the Oda and Uchiyamadani Rivers. The ground
there is supposed to consist of a flood plane. According to
the boring data at points 6k300 and 6k400, whose cross
section is presented in Fig. 3.3, the profile of the ground
layer could be estimated as follows.
(1) The bank materials are composed of sandy soil in the
lower layer and clayey material in the upper layer.
(2) Under the bank, there is an Ac layer with a depth of
3 m. Underneath the Ac layer, an As layer is found.
The breached cross section, at the end of the breaching
part toward the downstream, shows an old clayey
embankment covered by a new bank mainly composed
of gravel soil. At the surface layer, sandy material
dominates.
According to the observation of the cross section at the
downstream end of the breached location, it could be con-
firmed that the old bank was constructed of clayey soil cov-
ered by sandy soil. The surface layer is classified as clayey
material.
The breaching process can be supposed as follows.
(1) Increase in the water table.
(2) Overflow and occurrence of inundation inside the
bank:
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Fig. 2.1. Movement of rain from July 6 to 7, 2018. (Japan Meteorological Agency).
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Okayama Pref. 
Fig. 2.2. Total rainfall from July 5 to 7, 2018. (AMEDAS data, Japan Meteorological Agency).
Fig. 2.3. Cumulative precipitation and times of river breaches. (Graph was provided by Prof. Chikamori, Okayama University.)
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Fig. 2.4. Water level of Oda River at Higashiminari. (Data by Okayama
River Management Office, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism).
Fig. 3.2. Representative cross sections of embankment at Location 3k400.
Photo 3.1. Breached embankment. (Confluence of Takama and Oda
Rivers). (Photo was taken from left-side of Oda River.)
Fig. 3.3. Representative cross sections of embankment at Location 6k400.
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done on the bridge that crosses the Uchiyamadani River.
Then, the overflow area expanded to the area surrounding
the bank whose height is relatively lower than that of the
Oda River. The nearby residential area was submerged
due to the inundation inside the bank.
(1) Erosion at the backside slope of the bank and digging
at the toe of the bank: Overflow water eroded the
backside bank, and the cross section of the bank
was reduced. At the toe of the bank, a dig hole
1.5 m in depth was found beside Ichinokuchi Gate.
(2) Breach of the bank (Photo 3.2).
3.3. Breach of left-side bank of Suemasa River (point 0.4k)
At point 0.45k, which corresponds to the upstream area
of the breached site, Arii Bridge existed. It had been con-
structed in an area lower than the surrounding area and
traces of the overflow were found on the bridge.6k400 
4k200 
3k400
1k200
Fig. 3.1. Oda River and breached locations (Yahoo! Map).
Photo 3.2. Breached embankment. (Confluence of Uchiyamadani and
Oda Rivers). (Photo was taken from left-side bank of Oda River.)
Photo 3.3. Place where both side banks breached at Suemasa River.
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dicted as follows.
(1) The bank material is sand (Bs).
(2) A hard clay layer (Ac), about 5 m in depth, was found
as the ground layer under the bank. Underneath this
Ac layer, a well-compacted gravel layer (Dg) exists.
The breaching process can be supposed as follows.
(1) Increase in the water table.
(2) Overflow and occurrence of inundation inside the
bank:
Overflow occurred at the Arii Bridge due to the increase
in the river water level.
(3) Erosion of the backside slope of the bank.
(4) Breach of the bank: The erosion of the surface layer
progressed, the cross section was further reduced,
and finally, breaching occurred. The inclination of
the backside slope of the bank was 1:1.7, and the
safety factor against the slip failure was lower than
the required value of 1.2 (Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2007). It
can be supposed that the slip failure was affected by
the increasing water table.
3.4. Breach of left and right sides of Suemasa River bank
(point 0.7k)
In the upstream area from the breached location, the
height of the bank was lower than that in the downstream
area. The peak water level of the Oda River was supposed
to be higher than the bank height. At the breached loca-
tion, two pipelines ran under the river ground. The exis-
tence of these pipelines might have created a water route
and promoted piping failure. Furthermore, the piping
could be linked to the erosion of the backside of the bank.The ground layer at the breached location is predicted as
follows.
(1) The material of the bank is dominantly sand and the
surface layer is sand (Bs). Inside the bank, there is a
sand layer that is mixed with gravel (Bsg).
(2) As the ground layer under the bank, a hard clay layer
(Ac) about 2 m in depth was found. Underneath the
Ac layer, there is a well-compacted gravel layer (Dg).
The breaching process can be supposed as follows.
(1) Increase in the water table.
(2) Overflow: Overflow water eroded the backside of the
bank.
(3) Breach of the right-side bank (outflow of the bank
material): The erosion of the surface layer progressed,
the cross section was reduced, and finally, breaching
occurred.
(4) Breach of the left-side bank (outflow of the bank
material): With the breach of the left-side bank of
the Oda River at point 3k400, the water table in the
inside area of the right-side bank of the Suemasa
River increased, and overflow from the left-side bank
occurred. Due to the progression of erosion caused
by the overflow, the left-side bank breached.
Photo 3.3 presents the location of the breached left and
right banks. Although no traces of the overflow could be
found in Photo 3.4, the failure of the backside slope of
the bank can be observed. Due to the inclination of the
slope being 1:1.5 of the bank and the safety factor being
lower than the required safety value of 1.2, the shear failure
was supposed to have occurred due to the increase in pore
water pressure. Photo 3.5 shows the location where the
front side of the bank was eroded by the outside water.3.5. Breach of right-side bank of Takama River (point 0.1k)
and left-side bank (point 0.0k)
In the upstream area from the confluence with the Oda
River (point 0.0k), the height of the bank of the Takama
Photo 3.4. Failure of backside of slope without overflow at Suemasa
River.
Photo 3.5. Failure of front side of slope with erosion at Suemasa River.
Photo 3.6. Failure of front side of slope and overflow failure at Takama
River bank.
Photo 3.7. Failure of backside of slope at Takama River bank.
Photo 3.8. Erosion of backside of slope of bank with overflow at Madani
River.
Photo 3.9. Breach of left-side bank due to overflow at Madani River.
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overflow occurred due to the back water from the Oda
River.
The ground layer at the breached place is predicted as
follows based on the boring investigation at the Oda River
(point 3k400).(1) The material of the bank is classified as clayey sand
(Bsc).
(2) The ground layer under the bank was found to be a
hard clay layer (Ac) about 3 m in depth. Underneath
the Ac layer, a sand layer (As) was found to exist.
The breaching process can be supposed as follows.
(a) Map around Okayama Prefecture 
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table of the Takama River increased due to the infil-
tration and the back water from the Oda River. The
water table inside the bank also increased.
(2) Overflow: Overflow occurred due to further incre-
ments in the water table.
(3) Erosion of the backside of the bank: The erosion of
the surface layer progressed and the cross section
was reduced. At the downstream of the breached
area, dig holes 1.2 m in depth and 1.0 m in depth were
found on the left side of the river.
(4) Breach of the bank.
Photo 3.6 presents the breaching and the failure of the
front side slope of the bank due to the overflow and the
erosion. Photo 3.7 depicts the failure of the backside slope
of the bank. The reason for the failure can be predicted due
to the increase in pore water pressure inside the bank rather
than the erosion due to the inside inundation. Since thePhoto 3.10. Boiled sand at Oda River Basin. (Provided by M. Ishihara in
JGS Meeting of Urgent Investigation on Disaster by July 2018 heavy rain,
July 2018).
Photo 3.11. Boiled sand at Sunagawa River. (Photo provided by Prof.
Shiro Maeno, Okayama University.)
(b) Location of investigated reservoirs 
Yamada 
Kaburakoji 
Minamidani 
Ohta 
Eda 
Fig. 4.1. Locations of investigated sites.
Table 4.1
Results of laboratory tests (Modified from Fujimoto et al., 2018).
Reservoir Yamada Reservoir Minamidani Reservoir Ohta Reservoir Kaburakoji Reservoir
Density of soil particles qs (g/cm
3) 2.646 2.616 2.653 2.617
Natural water content wn (%) 23.6 17.4 25.2 4.5
Fine fraction content Fc (%) 49.6 22.6 71.1 24.5
Maximum particle size Dmax (mm) 9.5 9.5 4.75 9.5
Coefficient of uniformity Uc – 271.2 – 178.4
Particle size at 20% passing by
mass D20 (mm)
0.0029 0.036 0.0019 0.054
Liquid limit wL (%) – – 41.0 –
Plasticity index Ip – – 15.3 –
Classification Sand of fine fraction nature
with gravel
Gravelly sand of fine
fraction nature
Silt (low liquid
limit)
Sand of fine fraction nature
with gravel
Classification symbol (SF-G) (SFG) (ML) (SF-G)
Marker in Fig. 3.2  d h j
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Fig. 4.3. Cross section view of Kaburakoji Reservoir.
Photo 4.1. Damaged dike of Kaburakoji Reservoir.inclination of the slope was 1:1.5 and the safety factor was
lower than the required value, which is 1.0 for the front side
and 1.2 for the backside (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, 2007), the possibility of shear fail-
ure as the reason was high.3.6. Breach of left-side bank of Madani River (point 0.5k)
At the breached site, the height of the bank was lower
than the surrounding area. Since the bank height of theMadani River was lower than the peak water table of the
Oda River, the overflow was caused by the back water
from the Oda River.
The ground layer at the breached site was predicted
based on the boring investigation as follows.
Photo 4.3. Occurrence of debris flow close to Eda Reservoir.
Photo 4.2. Slope failure of Eda Reservoir.
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upper layer and clayey sand (Bsc) in the lower layer.
(2) The ground surface layer under the bank was identi-
fied as a hard clay layer (Ac) about 2 m in depth.
Underneath that layer, there were sand (As) and
gravel (Ag) layers.
The breaching process can be described as follows.
(1) Increase in the water table inside the bank: The water
table of the Madani River increased due to the pre-
cipitation and the back water from the Oda River.
(2) Overflow: Overflow occurred due to further incre-
ments in the water table.
(3) Erosion of the backside of the bank: The erosion of
the surface layer progressed and the cross section of
the bank was gradually reduced (Photo 3.8). At the
breached site, a dig hole 0.65 m in depth was found.Photo 4.4. Collapse of Minamidani Reservoir.(4) Breach of the bank: The bank breached due to the
erosion of the backside slope of the bank brought
about by the overflow (Photo 3.9).
Since the inclination of the slope was 1:1.5 and the safety
factor was lower than the required value of 1.2, the possi-
bility of shear slip failure was not low.
3.7. Discussion on the reasons for breaches of river banks
The main cause of bank breaching can be supposed to
be overflow, although slope failures of banks without over-
flow or boiled sand are also often observed. From these
observations, even in the cases of the overflow breaching,
before overflowing, it can be supposed that slip failures,
or piping, occurred.
The case of the Yabe River breach (Yabegawa Bank
Investigation Committee, 2013) is well known as piping
failure, and previous piping cases due to heavy rains have
been reported at the Oda River. Photo 3.10 and Photo
3.11 show sand boils at the Oda River and Sunagaewa
River sites (Numa, Higashi-ku, Okayama City) observed
during the 2018 July Heavy Rain, and it is possible that
the piping phenomena affected the breaches of the banks.
4. Detailed investigation of damage to reservoirs
A huge number of reservoirs were damaged due to the
heavy rain event in July 2018 around western Japan.
Among them, reservoirs in Hiroshima Prefecture and
Okayama Prefecture in particular were severely damaged.
This chapter introduces five damaged reservoirs in
Okayama Prefecture, namely, Kaburakoji Reservoir, Eda
Reservoir, Minamidani Reservoir, Ohta Reservoir, and
Yamada Reservoir. Fig. 4.1 shows the locations of the five
investigated reservoirs. The broken line in Fig. 4.1(a) indi-
cates the target area given in Fig. 4.1(b). The laboratory
test results of the soil obtained from the banks of four of
the damaged reservoirs and their classification based on
the Japanese Geotechnical Society standards are tabulated
in Table 4.1. Particle size distribution curves are presented
in Fig. 4.2. The detailed investigation was conducted on
July 10 and 28, October 5, and November 2, 2018, and
on February 5, 2019.Photo 4.5. Severe failure of Ohta Reservoir.
Photo 4.6. Severe failure of Yamada Reservoir.
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The Kaburakoji Reservoir is a homogeneous reservoir
with a reservoir capacity of 337,950 m3. It has an upstream(a) Okayama Prefecture
Fig. 5.1. Map of Okayama Prefec
Table 5.1
Investigated sites.
No. City District
1 Okayama Kita-ku, Tani mannar
2 Kita-ku, Fukui
3 Kita-ku, Haga
4 Kita-ku, Yamakami
5 Kurashiki Fukuda cho, Hiroe
6 Ibara Kamiizue cho
7 Iwakura cho
8 Ibara cho
9 Kasaoka Shigehira
10 Takahashi Ochiai bashi kita
11 Ochiai cho, Chikatsun
12 Ni-mi Uekumadani
13 Tsuyama Nakamitayama
14 Kibi-cyu-o Yoshikawa
15 Mitani
16 Kamoichibaslope ratio of vertical to horizontal of V:H = 1:2 and a
downstream slope ratio of V:H = 1:1.6. Its bank has a
height of 12.9 m, a length of 111.0 m, and a top width of
4.8 m. The cross section is presented in Fig. 4.3. A spillway
and a conduit were installed in the left and center parts of
the bank, respectively. Two levels of a stone masonry
retaining wall were constructed in the lower part, and the
crest of the bank was paved with asphalt. The bank mate-
rial consisted of sand of a fine fraction nature with gravel
(see Table 4.1), namely, Masa sand. Fig. 4.4 plots the depth
profile of the N-value obtained from Swedish weight
sounding test (SWS) results based on Japanese Industrial
Standards (JIS) using the approximate equation proposed
by Inada (1960), and the depth of 0 m corresponds to the
crest of the bank. The soil condition of the Masa sand
along the depth is loose, as seen in Fig. 4.4.(b) Investigated sites 
ture and the investigated sites.
Phenomenon Photo No.
i Debris flow
Shallow slope failure
Shallow slope failure
Shallow slope failure
Debris flow (2)
Shallow slope failure (3)
Shallow slope failure (4)
Shallow slope failure
Deep slope failure
Shallow slope failure
e Debris flow (5)
Shallow slope failure
Shallow slope failure
Shallow slope failure
Shallow slope failure
Shallow slope failure
(1) Aerial photo of entire slope failure 
(2) From fan top to fan 
(3) Entire photo of slope failure from low angle 
(4) Entire photo slope failure 
(5) From fan top to fan 
Photo 5.1. Some photos of the investigated sites.
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damaged asphalt road on the crest. This Scheme suggests
that the sliding failure was supposed to be caused by the
increasing pore water pressure due to heavy rainfall over
a long period and infiltration from the reservoir, because
no traces of an overflow were found and the shear strength
was low. In addition, the heavy water flow from the sloping
road could have been a factor in inducing the erosion of the
bank.
4.2. Eda Reservoir
Eda Reservoir is a zoned reservoir with a reservoir
capacity of 31,660 m3. It has an upstream slope ratio of
V:H = 1:2 and a downstream slope ratio of V:H = 1:1.8.
Its bank has a height of 9.0 m, a length of 102.0 m, and
a top width of 3.9 m. Masa sand was used for the construc-
tion of the bank, and a spillway was installed in the left
part of the bank. Photo 4.2 presents the slope failure of
the bank, which was covered with blue tarp to prevent
the penetration of rain after the disaster. Photo 4.3 shows
that the heavy rainfall caused the occurrence of a debris
flow close to the reservoir. The sediment inflow by the deb-
ris flow into the reservoir brought about an increase in the
level of the reservoir, which led to piping. It was suggested
that the slope failure might have been caused by the piping
failure that progressed along with the great leakage of
water in the bank, which was observed by the residents.
4.3. Minamidani Reservoir
Minamidani Reservoir is a small homogeneous reservoir
with a reservoir capacity of 100 m3. It has an upstream slope
ratio of V:H = 1:1.6 and a downstream slope ratio of V:
H = 1:1.2. Its bank has a height of 2.0 m, a length of
26 m, and a top width of 1.7 m. Inflow from a small moun-
tain stream into the reservoir led to a rise in the water sur-
face level. Hence, the overflow failure of the bank occurred,
as seen in Photo 4.4. The sediment outflow from the reser-
voir caused severe damage to an adjacent paddy field.
4.4. Ohta Reservoir
Ohta Reservoir is a homogeneous reservoir with a reser-
voir capacity of 17,000 m3. It has an upstream slope ratio
of V:H = 1:1 and a downstream slope ratio of V:
H = 1:1.5. Its bank has a height of 9.3 m, a length of
112.0 m, and a top width of 5.1 m. The bank material is silt
(see Table 4.1) which lies over the sedimentary rock. A
spillway and a conduit were constructed in the left and cen-
ter parts of the bank, respectively. Photo 4.5 shows the col-
lapse of the bank. It has been concluded that the collapse
might have been caused by sliding failure or piping failure,
Table 5.2
Summary of the investigated items.
No. Damage Scale (m) Type Geology Geography Yellow/Red Predispositions
1 Private houses, guardrail, water channel W: 6–8
D: 1–1.5
L: 25–30
Avalanche Mad stone soil Mild slope – Catchment terrain
2 Private houses, two injured persons W: 40
D: 12
L: 170
Rotational slip Sand stone, slate Ridge Yellow zone Geology,
Strike and dip of stratum
3 Peach field W: 15–1 8
D: 0.5
L: 10–12
Avalanche Granite, mountain
gravels
Steep slope – Steep slope
4 Part of a national road (Route 72) W: 16–18
D: 0.5
L:5–6
Avalanche mountain gravels, diorite Steep slope – Steep slope
5 Many private houses Valley head
W: 30
D: 10–15
L: 50
Debris flow Granite, tuff Valley Red and yellow zones Catchment terrain, steep
slope
6 Private house W: 50
D: 5
L: 150
Avalanche Granite, granitic soil Valley – –
7 Private house, crop field, guardrail, water
channel
W: 8–10
D: 1–1.5
L: 35–40
Avalanche Granite, granitic soil Ridge Yellow zone –
8 Part of a road, guardrail W: 20–25
D: 1.5–2.0
L: 15–20
Avalanche Tuff – – –
9 Car parts factory, six injured people, two
fatalities
W: 50
D: 5
L: 150
Avalanche Granite, granitic soil Ridge – –
10 Road embankment W: 15
D: 0.5–1.0
L: 22
Avalanche Slate – – Steep slope
11 Private houses, roads Valley head
W: 20
D: 0.5–1.0
L: 15
Debris flow Granite Valley Yellow zone Catchment terrain, steep
slope
12 Road embankment, private houses, railway W: 20
D: 0.5–1.0
L: 15
Avalanche – – – –
13 Private house W: 14
D: -
L: 9
Avalanche Schist Steep slope Yellow zone Steep slope
14 Part of a national road (Route 72) W: 5
D: 5
L: 10
Avalanche Granite Steep slope – Steep slope
15 Part of a farm road W: 15
D: 1
L: 10–12
Avalanche Granite Steep slope – Steep slope
16 Part of a concrete plant – Avalanche Granite – – –
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spillway.
4.5. Yamada Reservoir
Yamada Reservoir is a small homogeneous reservoir
with a reservoir capacity of 100 m3. It has an upstream
slope ratio of V:H = 1:1.8 and a downstream slope
ratio of V:H = 1:1.5. Its bank has a height of 3.0 m,
a length of 31 m, and a top width of 1.6 m. A spillway,
with a discharge capacity of 0.2 m3/s, was installed in
the left part of the bank. The collapse occurred at the
narrowest width of the bank, as seen in Photo 4.6,
and the sliding failure is shown in the lower part. The(a) Spatial distribution of cumulative precipitation  
Fig. 5.3. Comparison of spatial distribution betwe
(a) Location of weather stations        
Fig. 5.2. Distribution map of weather stations in Okoutflow, due to the inflow being greater than the capac-
ity of the spillway, caused damage to a downstream
paddy field.
4.6. Discussion on the reason for damage to water reservoir
banks
The main reason for the breaching of the banks was
overflow. According to the detailed investigation of the
damaged reservoirs, much of the damage was also caused
by slip failures or piping failures brought about by the
heavy rainfall which continued for a long period. In fact,
there is great possibility that the damage was caused by a
combination of several factors.  (b) Distribution of disaster sites 
(July 6~8)
en cumulative precipitation and disaster sites.
         (b) Mesh for the analysis 
ayama Prefecture and the mesh for the analysis.
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In this section, important observations on slope disas-
ters in Okayama Prefecture are presented. The investigated
sites are summarized in Table 5.1. Fig. 5.1 shows a map of
Okayama Prefecture and the sites investigated for slope
disasters/hazards. Some photos of the sites are given in
Photo 5.1, the numbers of which correspond to those listed
in Table 5.1.
The following items were investigated:
– Damage
– Possible mechanism
– Soil type/rock type/geology
– Geography
– Specified as being prone to slope disasters or not
– Predispositions/triggers
In Japan, local governments specify areas prone to slope
disasters based on the potential risks of slope failure that
can cause injury to humans. They define two types of areas
depending on the potential risks, namely, the yellow zone
and the red zone. The red zone’s risk is higher than that
of the yellow zone. The results of the investigation are sum-
marized in Table 5.2.
The relationship between the spatial distribution of the
disaster sites and the cumulative precipitation for three
days, from June 6 to 8, 2018, was examined. To estimate
the spatial distribution of cumulative precipitation, a map
of Okayama Prefecture was discretized with many cells,
as shown in Fig. 5.2, and the cumulative precipitation
was estimated for every cell through an inverse analysis.
A comparison of the estimated distribution map of the
cumulative precipitation is shown in Fig. 5.3. This figure
compares the spatial distribution of the cumulative precip-
itation with the distribution of the disaster sites. The cumu-
lative precipitation tends to be higher in the northwestern
part of Okayama and lower in the southeastern part, and
the two distributions are not necessarily similar. More
detailed and more numerous data on the distribution of
the disaster sites would be necessary to discuss the spatial
correlation between precipitation and slope failures.
6. Conclusions
(1) The two peaks in rainfall intensity during the 2018
July heavy rain and the long-time precipitation over48 h were the main causes of the damage to natural
slopes and geo-structures.
(2) As for the breach of river banks, the overflows were
predominant due to the back water phenomena.
Since shear slip failure and the sand boils were
observed, it was suspected that these factors were also
related to the breaches of the banks.
(3) Many earth-fill dams exist in the Setouchi area, and
several of them were seriously damaged. The main
causes were overflow, slip failure, and piping. For
small dams in particular, overflow failures were
observed. No damage was found for improved and
reinforced dams.
(4) No strong relationship was found between the slope
failures observed in the western area of Okayama
Prefecture and the cumulative precipitation.
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